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The deepening of economic and financial integration in the European Union has led to 
different responses from the group of ‘cohesion’ countries. Ireland and Portugal stand out as 
the two extreme examples, as Ireland caught-up to the forerunners very rapidly after the 
launching of EMU, in 1992, whereas Portugal lost ground. This paper looks at structural 
shifts in order to explain the different performances of the two economies. We conclude that 
Portugal’s labour productivity lag was the outcome of a less favourable structure of 
employment; that differences in the structure of employment are not clustered in specific 
industries; and that such structural differences are associated with different factor 
endowments, namely physical and human capital.  
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GROWTH IN THE ‘COHESION COUNTRIES’:  




Irish economic growth stands out as peculiar within recent European experience. In 
fact, Ireland went from being one of the poorest countries on the western part of the Continent 
in 1950 to one of the wealthiest by the end of the twentieth century. In 1962 Ireland took a 
decisive step towards opening up its economy, with the free trade agreement with the UK, and 
in 1973 Ireland joined the EEC and became a large receiver of financial transfers from 
Brussels. Yet, the change of tariff policy and structural funds did not impact directly on the 
growth rate of the Irish economy. Instead, twenty years later, Ireland took greater advantage 
of the intensification of the integration process led by the institution of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of the single market in 1992 and the Euro in 1999.  
The growth experience of the Portuguese economy differs markedly from that of 
Ireland. Following its accession to European Free Trade Association as a founding member, 
in 1959, Portugal also became increasingly more open to the external world and that was 
accompanied by high rates of economic growth and catching-up to the European core. After 
the first oil shock in 1973 and the political revolution that followed during 1974-75 the trend 
towards increasing openness was reversed. Soon after, in 1986, Portugal joined the EEC, in 
1992 ratified the Maastricht treaty and in 1999 joined the European single currency. Portugal 
also became a large recipient of cohesion funds, which weighted considerably in total 
investment in social overhead capital and education. Yet despite the increasing levels of 
political and monetary integration and despite cohesion funds, Portugal caught up with a  
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much lower degree of intensity during the period since accession, comparing to what 
happened in the decades before 1973.  
The different experiences of the two countries studied in this paper are associated with 
differences in many factors, which include, demographic growth and the performance of the 
labour market, the level of education, the share of FDI in manufacturing and service 
industries, the tax regime for foreign profit earnings, and the weight of ICT producing and 
using industries in total output. But how much did these factors matter? And why was Irish 
catching-up delayed?
1 What was the impact of the integration in the European communities 
for Ireland and Portugal?  
The paper is structured as follows. Part I, provides the background scenario of the 
development of the two economies since 1960. We also discuss in that section the effects of 
European integration on the structure of the two economies. Part II looks at structural changes 
in Ireland and Portugal. We present there a shift-share analysis of output growth in order to 
conclude whether labour productivity expanded as the outcome of the growth of dynamic 
sectors or of traditional sectors. We also give a measure of changes in the structure of the two 
economies according to the size of ICT using or producing industries and according to the 
size of industries that benefit from increasing returns to scale. The papers ends with a 
concluding section.  
 
 
I. THE TORTOISE AND THE HARE 
Ireland and Portugal, together with Spain and Greece, form the group of ‘cohesion’ 
countries within the European Union. That definition was established with the enlargement of 
the EEC to southern Europe, in 1981 and 1986, and was born out of the consideration that the 
integration into the Communities of the peripheral countries would imply measures to take 
                                                 
1 Cassidy (2004).   
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into account differentials in development levels. The stakes were high, in the 1980s, as were 
the perspectives that the convergence of European productivity and income per capita levels 
would advance rapidly. Yet, Portugal and to a certain extent Greece and Spain did not fulfil 
totally to the expectations, whereas the Irish economy had a very positive performance, 
particularly in the 1990s.  
The main trends of GPD per capita growth in the four countries during the period from 
1960 are shown in Table 1. In the period from 1960 to 1973, the three southern countries 
depict very high growth rates of income per capita, at rates close to 7 percent per year, 
whereas Irish growth, although historically high, remained behind, at 3.7 percent.
2 In 1973-
1980, Ireland was the fastest growing economy, and in 1980-1990 its growth rate was close to 
that of Portugal. After 1990, Irish economic growth took off reaching 5.8 percent per year, 
and surpassed by a great margin that of the other countries, whereas Portugal lagged behind, 
growing at under 2 percent per year. Table 2 shows relative income levels. There we may see 
that Ireland had a better position, in 1960, as compared to the average of the European Union 
14 members (Luxembourg excluded) and that it changed little down to 1980, to increase 
rapidly after 1990. Spanish relative position increased rapidly in 1960-1973 and again after 
1980. Contrarily, Portugal and Greece were the two poorest countries in 1960 and they leaped 
forward in the decade to 1973, to change very little afterwards. Table 3 provides the rates at 
which the four economies caught-up or diverged to the European Union 14 average.
3   
[TABLES 1 to 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
2 For Ireland we also use below GNP instead of GDP, due to overpricing of foreign owned 
firms which had an increasing large share of output. See Birnie and Hitchens (1996). See also 
O’Leary (1997) and Barry (2003).  
3 The lag of the southern economies and the Ireland towards the rest of Western Europe dates 
since at least the nineteenth century, and little catching-up occurred until World War II. See 
Lains (2003). See also Freitas (2000) and Barry (2003).  
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[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 shows the contribution of changes in labour productivity, employment rate 
and labour supply to the growth of income per head in the four countries, in three periods 
since 1974. The most important feature shown in the table is the fact that the rapid expansion 
of income per head in Ireland in the periods from 1987-2000 and 1994-2000 was due to the 
increase in the employment rate and labour supply. In fact, in 1994-2000, Irish income per 
head expanded at 7.1 percent per year and that was due to an increase in labour productivity 
of 3.1 percent, and increase in the employment rate of 1.8 percent and of labour supply of 2.4 
percent. Portugal’s increase in labour productivity was smaller but not by a large margin, at 
2.3 percent in the same period. The main difference between these two countries was in the 
expansion of labour and employment. Barry (2000a) argues that Ireland acted as an economic 
region of a larger economy, namely the United States and one of the effects of that is that 
changes in the Irish economic cycle were closely followed by factor movements to and from 
the United States.
4 Changes in Irish labour were due to the net flow of immigrants which 
increased labour supply and average labour participation rates. The impact of net immigration 
was also felt in the quality of the Irish labour market, as their levels of education and training 
were above the average of the Irish resident labour force. By contrast, in Portugal, the 
employment rate changed very little since 1994 as did labour supply, because immigration, 
although expanding, was relatively small in numbers.
5  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Despite the fact that the gap in terms of labour productivity growth was smaller than 
the gap in terms of growth in income per capita, we still need to explain why Ireland’s 
                                                 
4 Contrarily, during the 1970s and the 1980s, Ireland was a ‘regional’ economy of the UK and 
that would explain, according to Barry (2000a), Irish slower growth in that period. 
5 See Honohan and Walsh (2002).  
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productivity expanded slower than Portugal’s, before 1986, and why the comparative 
performance of the two countries was reversed in the years since.  
 
Historical trends since 1960 
Why did not Ireland take more advantage of its first stages of higher levels of 
integration in the European economy and why did she speed up growth much later on? In 
1958, a new phase of economic policy started in Ireland with the creation of the Industrial 
Development Authority, which provided grants to promote domestic and foreign investment. 
This was the start of an ‘industrialization-by-invitation strategy’.
6 During the 1960s the size of 
the Irish government increased significantly, but that was to a large extent the consequence of 
a significant increase in transfer payments, including social security, welfare, health and 
education. The share of the state in total investment remained small, around 5 percent of total 
gross capital formation throughout the decade.
7 The 1958 statute, however, was only a timid 
step towards liberalization of commercial links. In 1962, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
signed a free trade agreement that opened up the borders between the two countries.
8 Yet, the 
Irish economy changed little since demise of autarky in 1958. In 1973, at the eve of accession 
to the EEC, it was still highly protected and unable to explore markets abroad.  
The EEC led to the definitive blow to Irish long standing protectionist policies. In fact, 
four years after joining the communities, Ireland abolished all its tariffs with the other 
member states. Ireland also joined the European Monetary System in 1979, contrarily to the 
UK, which implied leaving the pound sterling area. The immediate implications of openness 
                                                 
6 Gotthreil (2003). 
7 See Gotthreil (2003), p. 727. 
8 The 1962 trade agreement followed the creation of EFTA, in 1959, by the UK and other six 
countries, including Portugal, and the French veto for UK accession, in 1961. The EFTA was 
geared mainly to industrial trade and Ireland was mainly an exporter of agricultural goods.  
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were considerable. Because of tariff removals, according to one account, 44 percent of firms 
closed, 88 percent of which in the textile sector, 50 percent in chemicals and metal products. 
In 1986, employment in ‘traditional’ sectors fell 76 percent of its 1980 level (72.6 percent in 
1992).
9 Such ‘destruction’ proved however to be ‘creative’, as shown by the development of 
the manufacturing sector in the years that followed to the present times. Those changes were 
facilitated by a series of favourable factors that worked in the same direction. According to 
Gotthheil (2003), the first factor was the financial assistance from the European Communities, 
under the form of structural funds, which peaked at 3 percent of GNP in 1993, and were 
directed to infrastructural investments that were necessary for the ulterior development of the 
new industrial sectors. More importantly, FDI expanded very fast in the 1980s and 1990s and 
in particular investment from multinationals.
10 The Industrial Development Authority had an 
important role and it backed investment in industries that were considered more important to 
growth in the new open economy, namely, electronics, computer and pharmaceutical 
industries, and which administered a ‘generous industrial grant system’. Thus, foreign funds 
which were attracted by helped by an appropriate institutional framework favourable to 
multinationals and the work of IDA eased the pressure on the balance of payments and on the 
state budget and allowed for heavy investment in infrastructures. Capital imports together 
with the existence of comparative advantages in industries with high levels of factor 
productivity and expanding international demand, accounted for the rapid response of the 
Irish manufacturing sector.  
The data on Irish FDI is in fact impressive. In 1973, foreign firms employed 32.3 
percent of total labour force, of which 7.3 percent were US and 14.6 percent of the UK. In 
1994, foreign firms employed 44 percent of labour force, of which 23.2 percent from the US 
                                                 
9 See Barry (1996), pp. 727-8. 
10 In 1981, the tax on foreign earnings profits was raised from zero to 10 percent, still well 
below most western European countries. See Honohan and Walsh (2002), p. 3.  
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and just 5.8 percent from the UK. Irish European integration led to the growth of her Atlantic 
links. But such changes in the structure of firm ownership occurred before the big spurt in 
Irish growth that took place essentially after 1994. Thus the explanation of the big spurt lays 
elsewhere. Rapid growth in the last decade was a consequence of the ‘fruition of a cluster 
effect’ derived from investment by multinational firms in computers, pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries. This interpretation points to a delayed effect of FDI from the US. But 
why did US firms choose Ireland? According to the same author, profits were substantially 
higher in Ireland, where they could be close or higher than 30 percent, whereas in the US the 
same firms profit rates average 5 percent.
11  
Portugal’s post-war experience was different in many aspects. The opening up to the 
European markets took off in 1959 with the accession to EFTA, created in that year behind 
the leadership of the UK and in reaction to the creation of the EEC, two years previously. The 
EFTA led to a substantial change in the structure of Portuguese exports which followed the 
slow change that had been occurring in the manufacturing sector. But, during these early 
stages, industrial change was led by a ‘traditional’ sector, namely textiles. Moreover, the 
Portuguese government got a special treatment from its more industrialized EFTA partners 
(the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria) and it could continue to 
protect its industrial sector, under the understanding that many industries were starting. This 
special regime allowed the support of the State to industries that were considered relevant for 
the development of the economy and they included fundamentally capital intensive industries, 
such as cement, chemicals, metallurgy and metal works. Rapid growth and structural change 
came to a halt in 1973, following the first oil shock. The 1974 revolution that would lead to a 
democratic regime in 1976 gave a further blow in the system that led to such favourable 
                                                 
11 Gotthreil (2003). Rates of profit can be highly inflated by manipulation of internal pricing 
my multinationals, in order to take full advantage of the low corporate profit tax in Ireland. 
See Honohan and Walsh (2002).  
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results. A decade of political instability, high inflation, increasing unemployment, distressed 
public finances and external imbalances ensued. Moreover the expansion of the foreign 
sector, which had jumped from 20 percent to 35 percent of GDP during the decade that 
followed the EFTA accession, stalled and the economy became increasingly protected by 
tariffs and other forms of State intervention.
12 
When Portugal joined the EEC in 1986 its manufacturing sector was already markedly 
different from the situation in 1973. In the years following accession, the Portuguese 
economy reached high rates of growth and that was due to the expansion of exports, as well 
the effect of investments in infrastructures which, like Ireland, were partially financed by 
European structural funds. At the same time, the economy went under structural 
transformation with the sharp decline of employment in the primary sector, once again made 
possible by European sources of finance through the Common Agriculture Policy. In these 
early years investment in education and thus in human capital increased more rapidly then 
before and for the first time human capital had a higher contribution than physical capital in 
the aggregate production function. Contrarily to Ireland at a later period, the resumption of 
growth was not led by the manufacturing sector, as the service sector also expanded rapidly.
13 
Moreover, as we shall see below, there were no relevant changes in the structure of 
manufacturing towards new and more productive industries of the kind we find in Irish 
growth in the 1990s.  
 
The effects of the Single European Market 
European integration was deepened by the institution of the Economic and Monetary 
Union that led to the Single European Market (SEM), in 1992, and the Euro, in 1999, which 
led to the intensification of flows of trade and capital. The impact of the growth of trade and 
                                                 
12 See Lains and Silva (2005), Vol. 3. 
13 See Lains (2003).  
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capital flows in the member states of the Union and the extent and direction of the impacts 
depended on various factors, among which we may include relative levels of economic 
development, institutional arrangements such as tax levels, and structures of economic 
activity and comparative advantage.  
According to Barry (1996) the traditional neo-classical view posits that ‘free trade and 
greater infrastructural development in peripheral regions will hasten convergence’, but that 
has not always been confirmed empirically. In fact, he argues that ‘one can reject the notion 
of absolute convergence as applying to regions or economies that differ substantially from 
each other in important respects, even though they might have strong trading links’. He ads 
that it is more important to disentangle ‘the structural transformations of the economy 
wrought by free trade from the influences exerted by technological and global developments 
and the major swings in fiscal policy of the last two decades.’
14  
A similar type of conclusion is given by Krugman and Venables (1990 and 1996), 
according to whom ‘the net effect of the sectoral gains and losses resulting from trade 
liberalization could be negative for peripheral economies.’ They argue that if trade is 
primarily based on comparative advantages at the inter-industry level, the widening of the 
market leads most likely to the reinforcement of the established patterns of comparative 
advantage and thus to higher levels of specialization and regional concentration. Contrarily, if 
trade is based on intra-industry specialization, the effect of the wider market is uncertain and 
it may lead to wider specialization across regions. Moreover, the reduction of barriers to trade 
                                                 
14 See also ESRI (1997), where it is argued that ‘the process underlying the development of 
the small open economies of the EU periphery might be quite different from those underlying 
the development of the ‘core’ EU economies, on which the 1988 Cecchini analysis had been 
based.’ For the analysis of the effects of European integration since the creation of EEC and 
EFTA, see also Henrekson et al. (1997). They conclude that membership impacted positively 
on growth and that it did not matter whether the country adhered to the EEC or EFTA.   
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in the case that industries are characterized by increasing returns of scale leads to the increase 
of the size of average firms, but firms can expand either by increasing their geographical 
concentration or by expanding their locations. Midelfart et al. (2003) argue in the same lines. 
According to them, the EMU led to an increase in trade among European Union member 
countries and that the trade increase led to higher geographical specialization, as ‘firms 
relocate to benefit from comparative advantage and clustering’. They also conclude that such 
changes had a positive impact in overall EU economic growth.  
Despite all the fears, the impact of higher levels of integration within the European 
Union was beneficial to the Irish economy because it led to the expansion of industries with 
higher productivity levels. That is concluded by Barry et al. (2001), who look at the impact of 
the Single European Market on the restructuring of the manufacturing sector and on the 
growth of demand for Irish produce abroad. 
A more general perspective is given by Davies et al. (2001) who conclude that EMU 
did not affect considerably the pattern of geographical specialization across the Union. In 
their survey of studies on the impact of the Single European Market, they conclude that ‘prior 
to 1992, it was argued that the SEM would systematically change the nature of competition, 
and therefore the structure of industries and firms. This was expected to result from the 
market-widening effect of removing the remaining non-tariff barriers, which would lead to 
greater realization of scale economies and, perhaps, a toughening in the competitive regime in 
industrial markets.’ Moreover, industries where product differentiation through advertising 
and research and development was more important would thus tend to show higher levels of 
increasing returns to scale and thus the widening of the European market would lead to higher 
degrees of concentration, both at the aggregate level and within each country. In order to 
gauge the impact of the SEM in the industrial structure, Davies et al. (2001) test the effect of 
changes in trade, foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions on four ‘structural 
dimensions’ of firms, namely: concentration, diversification, multinationality and  
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geographical agglomeration. They use two matrices for European industrial structures at the 
national level for 1987 and 1993. Their main conclusions are, firstly, that concentration levels 
remained stable, as the largest 100 firms accounted for about 30 percent of total 
manufacturing output in both 1987 and 1993. Secondly, the activity of multinationals 
expanded across Europe in the same period, as the share of turnover of the 100 firms 
produced outside the home country increased from 30 to 37 percent. Thirdly, there was a 
limited increase in the core business of the same firms, which implies a small decline of 
product diversification. Fourthly, there was no general increase in geographical concentration 
of firms.  
 
 
II. STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
In order to measure the impact of increasing degree of openness in the Irish and 
Portuguese economies we need to analyse the changes in their structures. The structures of the 
economies of Ireland and Portugal since 1979 can be compared by using data compiled by the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
15 Figure 3 compares the distribution of 
employment for the two countries, in 1979 and 2002. We can see that, in 1979, both Ireland 
and Portugal still had a large share of labour employed in the primary sector, which strongly 
declined in the years to 2002, although the transformation was more important in Portugal 
than in Ireland. In fact, Portugal’s primary sector declined from 23.0 to 10.8 percent, from 
1979 to 2002, whereas in Ireland the same decline was fro 18.1 to 6.8 percent. We can also 
observe a decline in ‘Food, drink and tobacco’ and that in 2002 the two countries had similar 
shares. There was also decline in ‘Textiles, leather, footwear and clothing’, but Portugal’s 
employment remained more concentrated in these industries than Ireland, where they virtually 
disappeared. As we move to the right hand side of Figure 3, we can observe more similarities 
                                                 
15 See also the OECD STAN data base which in its latest version includes Ireland.   
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than differences. The most relevant difference is the higher level of labour force in Ireland in 
‘Electrical equipment and instruments’, ‘Communications’ and ‘Financial intermediation’. 
The size of ‘Non-market services’, which includes education, health and public 
administration, is again similar in the two countries (although, ‘Public administration’ was 
higher in Portugal, in 2002, whereas ‘Education’ was relatively similar in the two countries 
and ‘Health’ was higher in Ireland).   
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of relative levels of labour productivity for the two 
countries, in 1979 and 2002, measured in purchasing power parity equivalents. In 1979, 
Portugal’s total labour productivity was 91.3 percent that of Ireland and in 2002 that ratio had 
declined to 57.9 percent.
16 The most important conclusion we can draw form that data is that 
there is no discernible pattern in the comparison of labour productivity levels. For example, 
Portugal had lower labour productivity in ‘Agriculture’, as well as in ‘Scientific instruments’, 
and ‘Construction’. On the other hand, Portugal had higher levels of labour productivity in 
industries such as ‘Motor vehicles’, ‘Electricity’, ‘Communications’, and ‘Financial 
intermediation’. Productivity differential are thus not clustered in industries that could be 
classified as modern or intensive in the use of ICT.  
 [FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Structural change and productivity growth: a shift-share analysis 
To estimate the contribution of structural change to productivity growth we use now a 
shift-share analysis that breaks down the growth of aggregate productivity into the following 
components: intra-industry effect, static effect and dynamic effect. The intra-industry effect 
                                                 
16 We use in this comparison the PPP exchange rates implicit in total GDP. It should be taken 
into account, thought, that Irish GDP is inflated by over than 10 percent, due to overpricing of 
multinationals (see above).   
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refers to changes of productivity within each sector. The static component refers to 
circumstances in which resources shift towards sectors with productivity levels above the 
average. The dynamic component refers to circumstances in which resources shift to sectors 
with productivity growth rates above the average. This is known as the Verdoon effect or the 
‘structural bonus’, which associates increases in labour productivity and output through the 
effects of increasing specialisation (Verdoon 1949).
17 
I consider here the modified shift-share analysis developed by Timmer and Szirmai 
(2000) to take into account the dynamic Verdoon effect. This analysis takes labour 
productivity (LPt) or output per person employed (Yt / Lt) as the product of sectorial labour 
productivity levels and the share of labour in each sector (S): 
                        n                                           n             
        LPt = Yt / Lt = ∑ Y(t, i) L(t, i) / L(t, i) Lt = ∑ L(t, i) S(t, i)                            
                                      i=1                                        i=1 
The change in labour can be computed as: 
                                       n                                              n                                             n 
LPt - LP0 =  ∑(LP(t, i) – LP(0, i)) S(0, i) + ∑(S(t, i)  – S(0, i)) LP(0, i) + ∑(S(t, i) – S(0, i)) (LP(t, i) – LP(0, i)) 
                    i=1                                           i=1                                          i=1     
   ( 1 )     ( 2 )        ( 3 )  
 
The first term is the change in labour productivity attributed to intra-branch  productivity 
growth, the second term is the static effect of structural change on productivity growth, and 
the third term is the dynamic effect. The analysis is carried out for three periods since 1979, 
presented in Table 5. 
                                                 
17 The shift-share analysis here used has several limitations, including the fact that it measures 
average instead of marginal productivity and that it only takes into account the labour input. 
Similar calculations for Portugal are presented in Lains (2004)  
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  By far, the major factor behind labour productivity growth in Ireland since 1979 is the 
effect of productivity changes within each industry. In 1979-86 the intra-industry effect 
accounted for 71.2 percent of change, it increased to 98.5 percent in 1986-94 and then 
declined to 71.1 percent in 1994-2002. The static effect which measures the change in the 
share of industries with above average labour productivity levels accounted for 37.2 percent 
of the change in 1979-86, and that effect declined significantly in the two following periods. 
Instead, the dynamic effect, that is the growth of the share of industries with productivity 
growth above average, started as negative and increased substantially to account for 26.9 
percent of total labour productivity growth in the last period in the table, from 1994 to 2002. 
Portugal’s performance was markedly different, as the dynamic effect was negative in both 
1986-1994 and 1994-2002, and impacted negatively in labour productivity growth by -53.5 
percent in the first period and -39.1 percent in the second period. In other words, in Portugal 
labour was leaving the industries, in both manufacturing and services, with above average 
productivity growth, contrasting to what was happening contemporarily in Ireland.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Irish structural bonus  
  In order to explain why Ireland managed to benefit from such a structural bonus 
whereas Portugal did not, we need to see what industries contributed to the labour 
productivity upsurge. The literature points to two different types of conclusions which have 
quite different implications in terms of our perception of the reasons behind the Irish 
catching-up of the last 15 years or so and, consequently, about the prospects of backward 
economies to catch-up in the context increasing European Union integration. According to 
Cassidy (2004), the ‘Irish pick-up in growth [in the 1990s] was primarily driven by the 
performance of a small number of foreign dominated high-technology sectors; productivity 
growth in the more traditional manufacturing sector and the services sector was more  
 
16
modest’. Barros (2002) reached a different conclusion, stating that, ‘according to our analysis, 
traditional industries have been at least as important as ICT-producing industries for the 
convergence process within the European Union’. 
  We now revert to estimating the contribution of ICT producing and using sectors to 
the growth of labour productivity. Table 6 provides the distribution of labour force according 
to the ICT taxonomy given by O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003) and there we may see some 
differences between Ireland and Portugal (see also Figure 5). In fact, the share of ICT 
producing and using industries in the manufacturing and the service sectors in Ireland totalled 
25.4 percent of labour force in 1979 and 33.5 percent in 2002. In Portugal that share was 
slightly below Ireland’s in 1979, at 22.1 percent and remained so in 2002 at 25.4 percent. 
Table 7 shows the contribution of each sector to total labour productivity growth and we may 
see that ICT using and producing industries accounted for 42.3 percent of labour productivity 
growth in Ireland in 1994-2002, whereas in Portugal they accounted for just 25.9 percent in 
the same period. Table 7 also shows that Ireland outperformed Portugal particularly in the 
ICT producing manufacturing industries, the contribution of which to labour productivity 
growth expanded from 9.8 percent in 1979-1986 to 15.8 percent in 1994-2002, whereas in 
Portugal that contribution was just 1.4 percent in the later period.  
[TABLES 6, 7 and 8 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
  The data on the composition of labour force and the contribution to labour 
productivity growth according to the ICT taxonomy does lead to the conclusion that Ireland’s 
better performance was due to those sectors in which information and communication 
technologies were more important. Yet, that data also shows that Portugal did not fare 
particularly badly in that respect. In fact, we may see that the ICT using manufactures 
contributed in a similar way in the two countries in 1994-2002; and similar contributions can 
be found in the ICT using services. Moreover, the data on Tables 6 and 7 also show that what  
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was happening in the remaining sectors was of paramount importance. In fact as much as 57.7 
percent of labour productivity growth was due to non-ICT sectors in Ireland, the figure for 
Portugal being of course much higher, at 74.1 percent.
18 Table 8 gives a further classification 
of the manufacturing sector, according to the shares of ‘favoured’ sectors and increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) sectors, following the definition by Barry et al. (2001).
19 We may see 
there that Irish structural change was geared to those sectors more intensively than Portugal, 
as they accounted for about 40 percent of labour force in 2002, whereas in Portugal the 
similar share is 17.3 percent for the former and 25.2 percent for the later. 
 
The relevance of the structural bonus 
Irish and Portuguese labour productivity differed because of the joint effect of lower 
levels of productivity in certain industrial branches and also because of differences in the 
structures of the two economies. In order to measure the impact of these two factors, we may 
compare two counterfactual situations. The first is one where we take the structure of the 
Portuguese economy and the levels of Irish labour productivity; the second situation is one 
where we take Irish structure and Portuguese levels of productivity. Table 9 shows actual 
                                                 
18 Barros (2002) also finds that the relation between speed of convergence and ICT-intensity 
is not significant for the cohesion countries during 1971-1992. Sánchez and Duarte (2005) 
also find that the contribution to structural change and productivity growth in Spain during 
1980-1994 derived from a varied range of industries, including ‘high technology’ industries 
(i.e. computers, electrical, electronic and optical goods), ‘medium-high technology’ industries 
(chemical, machinery and automobiles), ‘high-qualification’ services (communications, 
banking, education and health) and other services (commerce, transport and public 
administration). 
19 ‘Favoured’ sectors were defined for the Irish economy only. We use the same definition for 
Portugal and it is only indicative. The definition of IRS sectors is nor country-specific.   
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aggregate labour productivity levels in the two countries and the two counterfactuals. In 2002, 
Irish total labour productivity was 1.725 times that of Portugal. Counterfactual A measures 
the situation in which we take the structure of Portuguese labour employment and the levels 
of Irish productivity and that implies a difference towards Portugal’s actual level of a factor of 
just 1.425. On the other hand, if we consider a counterfactual where we take Irish 
employment structure and Portuguese labour productivity levels, the difference is 1.751. This 
exercise shows that the main cause of the productivity differential of the two countries is the 
differences in the structure of employment and not differences in labour productivity levels.
20  
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
  Differences in the structure of employment in the two economies can be explained in 
terms of supply constrains and in particular in terms of endowments of physical and human 
capital in the two countries. Table 10 shows relative levels of physical and human capital per 
worker in the two countries in 1980 and 2000. Three relevant conclusions can be drawn from 
the figures there. The first one is that the levels of both forms of capital were higher in 
Ireland. The second is that the difference in endowments has declined rapidly in terms of 
physical capital, from a ration of 2.24 in 1980 to a ratio of 1.47 in 2000, and less so in terms 
of human capital, namely, from 1.36 to 1.25 in the same time span. The third relevant 
conclusion is that the deficit for Portugal in terms of physical capital is higher than the one in 
terms of human capital.  





                                                 
20 This analysis does not take into account the interaction between structure and labour 




The structure of the Irish and Portuguese economies changed dramatically in the 
period from 1979 to 2002, but that changed occurred in quite different ways. In both 
countries, there was a reduction in the share of the labour force employed in traditional 
sectors, which was compensated by an increase in the shares of modern sectors. But that 
transformation was quicker in Ireland than in it was in Portugal. The impact of such structural 
change on the growth of labour productivity was quantified in this paper: as much as 29% of 
Ireland’s labour productivity growth between 1994 and 2002 was due to increasing numbers 
of people engaged in industries where productivity was increasing rapidly. By contrast, 
changes in the structure of the Portuguese economy had a negative impact on the growth of 
the country’s labour productivity, which accounted for minus 39% of labour productivity 
growth.  
Moreover, the shares of ICT-producing and ICT-using industries in the manufacturing 
and the service sectors expanded faster in Ireland, increasing from 25.4 to 33.5 percent, from 
1979 to 2002, whereas in Portugal that share barely changed, in the same period, from 22.1 to 
25.4 percent. ICT related industries accounted for 42.3 percent of labour productivity growth 
in Ireland in 1994-2002 and just 25.9 percent in Portugal, in the same period. In 
manufacturing, Ireland also had a ‘structural’ advantage, as about 40 percent of labour force 
was employed in ‘favoured’ or increasing returns to scale (IRS) sectors, in 2002, whereas the 
same shares in Portugal amounted to only 17.3 percent (‘favoured’ sectors) and 25.2 (IRS 
sectors). 
Why did changes in the economic structures of the two economies have such different 
effects? The answer lies in the structure of the comparative advantages of the two countries: at 
the start of the period, Portugal had comparative advantages in sectors with lower levels of 
labour (and thus presumably capital) productivity. The abandonment of tariff protection and 
the adoption of the euro implied a higher degree of exposure to international market forces  
 
20
and thus to increases in the output of those lower productivity industries. By contrast, Ireland 
had comparative advantages in higher labour productivity industries and thus benefited from 
the higher level of participation in the international economy. The main reason for the better 
structure found throughout in the Irish economy is related to the fact that its endowments in 
physical and human capital were higher, as compared to Portugal.  
There are some relevant policy implications that we can derive from our conclusions.  
According to Esteban (2000), if countries (or regions) that lag behind suffer from a ‘uniform 
productivity gap’, then one should back ‘present EU regional policies based on structural 
funds essentially geared to improve infrastructures and human capital’, and not specific 
policies geared to promote ICT-producing industries. Policies directed towards infrastructures 
and education would help bridge Portugal’s lags in physical and human capital endowments. 
But one shouldn’t be too optimistic. The kind of policies mentioned above was implemented 
after Portugal’s accession to the European Communities, in 1986, under the designation of 
structural funds. The changes in the structure of the Portuguese economy that we observed in 
this paper were to an unknown extent related to the structural funds transfers. Yet the changes 
observed in Portugal were much less impressive than what we could observe in Ireland, 
particularly after the early 1990s. That does not come as a surprise - foreign direct investment 
and export growth are certainly more powerful sources of structural change and productivity 
growth than inter-governmental transfers within the European Union. The fact that those two 
sources of growth may be interrelated implies that financial transfers within the European 
Union would benefit the most the receiving countries if they lead to more private international 
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    Table 1 – Growth of real GDP per capita in the  
Cohesion Countries, Europe and the USA, 1960-2004 
(annual growth rates, percent) 
 
  1960-1973 1973-1980 1980-1990 1990-2004 
Greece  6.75 2.58  1.23 2.43 
Ireland  3.70 3.19 3.07 5.83 
Portugal  6.64 2.24 3.13 1.83 
Spain  6.96 2.62 2.74 2.58 
 
EU-14  4.18 2.19 2.02 
2.03 
USA  2.88 1.95 2.09 1.96 
 
EU-14: Luxembourg excluded. 
Source: Computed from Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy 






Table 2 – GDP per capita in the Cohesion Countries, PPP (EU14 = 100) 
 
 1960  1973  1980  1990  2004 
Greece  54.2 76.9 77.7 70.9 76.1 
Ireland   67.0 62.6 67.2 76.1  124.9 
Portugal  45.7 63.5 62.5 68.8 67.4 
Spain  50.7 73.7 76.4 81.9 88.3 
 




Table 3 – Convergence of real GDP per capita in the Cohesion Countries, 1958-1990 
(annual growth rates, percent) 
 
  1960-1973 1973-1980 1980-1990 1990-2004 
Greece  2.72 0.16 -0.92 0.51 
Ireland   -0.52 1.02 1.26 3.60 
Portugal  2.58 -0.24 0.98 -0.15 
Spain  2.92 0.52 0.70 0.54 
 
Note: un-conditional beta-convergence defined as: 
 φ    =  [(yi / y15) ( t +  n)  / (yi / y15) ( t ) ] 
[ 1 /  n ] 
where y i is income per capita for each of the 4 cohesion countries and y15 is the average for 
EU-15.  
Source: See Table 1. 
 
 















Greece 0.8  0.8  -0.4  0.4 
Ireland   1.6  2.7  -0.9  -0.2 
Portugal 1.1  3.0  -0.5  -1.4 
Spain 1.2  3.1  -1.4  -0.5 
EU-15 1.7  2.0  -0.6  0.3 
 
1987-2000 
    
Greece 1.7  1.5  -0.4  0.6 
Ireland    5.6 3.0 1.0 1.5 
Portugal  3.6 2.6 0.4 0.6 
Spain  3.0 1.2 0.5 1.3 
EU-15  1.8 1.7 0.1 -0.1 
 
1994-2000 
    
Greece 2.8  2.2  -0.4  0.9 
Ireland    7.1 2.9 1.8 2.4 
Portugal  3.1 2.3 0.2 0.5 
Spain  3.1 1.1 1.2 0.8 
EU-15  2.4 1.6 0.4 0.4 
      





Table 5 – Shift-share analysis of labour productivity growth, 1979-2002 (percent) 
 
  Ireland Portugal 
  1979-1986 1986-1994 1994-2002 1979-1986 1986-1994 1994-2002 
Total 
change 




71.2 98.5 71.1 65.2 65.1  139.3 
Static 
effect 
37.2 7.8  2.0 36.3  88.4 -0.3 
Dynamic 
effect 
-8.5 -6.3 26.9 -1.6  -53.5  -39.1 
 
Sources: See text. Computed from Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry 




Table 6 – Distribution of labour force according to ICT Taxonomy, 1979-2002 (percent) 
 
  Ireland Portugal  
 
27
  1979 1986 1994 2002 1979 1986 1994 2002 
ICT Producing 
Manufacturing  1.1 1.5 2.4 3.2 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 
ICT Using 
Manufacturing  6.2 6.3 6.1 4.6 6.8 6.8 7.2 5.7 
ICT Producing 
Services   3.6 3.6 2.7 4.4 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 
ICT Using 
Services    14.5 17.7 19.0 21.3 13.5 14.4 16.7 17.9 
Non-ICT 
Manufacturing  14.0 11.9 10.6  8.5 16.9 16.4 13.9 11.2 
Non-ICT Services  
  31.0 34.7 39.0 39.6 27.1 32.0 38.8 41.1 
Non-ICT Other  
  29.6 24.3 20.2 18.5 34.0 28.5 21.9 22.4 
TOTAL 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.00 100.0 
 
Note: ICT taxonomy definition according to O'Mahony and Van Ark (EC; 2003), p. 49. 
ICTPM: office machinery; insulated wire electronic valves and tubes; telecommunication equipment; radio and 
television receivers; scientific instruments. 
ICTPS: communications; computer and related activities. 
ICTUM: clothing; printing and publishing; mechanical engineering; other electrical machinery and apparatus; 
other instruments; building and repairing of shipping and boats; aircraft and spacecraft; railroad equipment and 
transport equipment; furniture; miscellaneous manufacturing; recycling. 
ICTUS: wholesale trade and commission trade; except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail trade except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal household goods; financial intermediation; except insurance 
and pension funding; insurance and pension funding; except compulsory social security; activities auxiliary to 
financial intermediation; renting of machinery and equipment; research and development; legal, technical and 
advertising. 
NICTM: food, drink and tobacco; textiles; leather and footwear; wood and products of wood and cork; pulp, 
paper and paper products; mineral oil refining, coke and nuclear fuel; chemicals; rubber and plastics; non-
metallic mineral products; basic metals; fabricated metal products; motor vehicles. 
NICTS: sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel; hotels 
and catering; inland transport; water transport; air transport; supporting an auxiliary transport activities; activities 
of travel agents; real estate activities; other business activities; public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security; education; health and social work; other community, social and personal services; private 
households with employed persons; extra-territorial organizations and bodies. 
NICTO: agriculture; forestry; fishing; mining and quarrying; electricity, gas and water supply; construction. 
 




                  Table 7 – Contribution to labour productivity growth according to  
                                          ICT Taxonomy, 1979-2002 (percent) 
 
  Ireland 
 
Portugal   
  1979-86 1986-94 1994-02 1979-86 1986-94 1994-02 
ICT Producing 
Manufacturing  9.8 3.4  15.8 0.6 2.0 1.4 
ICT Using 
Manufacturing  7.1 6.3 8.4 6.5 6.2 8.5 
ICT Producing 
Services    2.9 3.6 2.0 1.3 2.3 1.3 
ICT Using 
Services   10.1  14.3  16.1 11.6 12.2 14.7 
Non-ICT 
Manufacturing  20.1 12.8 11.1 16.4 15.2 16.7 
Non-ICT Services  
  26.4 32.3 30.2 24.3 26.9 35.6 
Non-ICT Other  
  23.5 27.3 16.5 39.3 35.1 21.9 
TOTAL 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 





Table 8 – Labour force in “Favoured” and Increasing Returns to Scale Sectors 
(thousands and percent) 
 
    Ireland  Portugal 
Thousands   ISIC  3 1979 1986  1994  2002  1979  1986  1994  2002 
Food, drink & tobacco  15-16  62  54  51  57  186  168  154  143 
Textiles  17 16 11  9  6  206  180  127  97 
Clothing  18 17 16  13  4  142  148  168  132 
Leather and footwear  19  6  2  1  1  56  68  76  55 
Wood & products and cork  20  5  4  5  7  68  58  55  55 
Pulp & paper products *  21 6 5  5  6  17  15  14  11 
Printing & publishing  22  13  12  17  24  29  28  36  33 
Mineral oil refining, coke    23  0  1  1  1  3  3  3  2 
Chemicals # *    24 13 14  20  27  42  40  30  26 
Rubber & plastics # *  25 7 8  10  11  25  23  23  26 
Non-metallic mineral prod *  26 15 13  11  12  66  55  59  56 
Basic metals *  27 4 3  3  3  17  15  13  11 
Fabricated metal products  28  14  10  12  16  59  53  52  55 
Mechanical engineering # *  29 12 13  15  16  31  27  24  26 
Office machinery # *  30 5 7  12  22  1  5  1  0 
Insulated wire # *  313 1 1  2  2  5  5  6  8 
Other electrical machiny # *  31-313 6 8  10  12  19  19  23  26 
Electronic valves and tubes  321  1  2  4  11  10  9  7  6 
Telecommunication  equip  #  322 1 1  3  4  2  2  2  6 
Radio and TV receivers #  323  0  0  1  1  11  9  7  6 
Scientific instruments #  331  4  5  8  16  5  4  4  5 
Other  instruments  33-331 3 4  4  6  2  2  2  2 
Motor vehicles # *  34 8 4  4  5  17  15  18  21 
Building & rep of ships *  351 2 1  1  1  28  17  7  4 
Aircraft and spacecraft # *  353 0 0  0  0  1  1  2  1 
Railroad & transp equip *  352+359 4 5  4  6  3  2  5  3 




Part B – “Favoured” Sectors (#)              
Total  Manufacturing   239 212  235  288  1.104  1.016  975  874 
Total Favoured Sectors    58  60  84  117  160  150  140  151 
FAV / Total Manuf (percent)    24.2  28.5  36.0  40.5  14.5  14.8  14.3  17.3 
                 
Part C – IRS Sectors (*)                 
Total Manufacturing     239  212  235  288  1.104  1.016  975  874 
Total IRS     84  79  95  122  273  239  224  220 
IRS / Total Manuf (percent)    35.1  37.2  40.6  42.3  24.7  23.5  23.0  25.2 
                 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, February 2005, at 





                        Table 9 – Actual and counterfactual total labour productivity  
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Notes: Values adjusted according to the implicit PPP deflator of GDP for Portugal and GNP 
for Ireland. 
Counterfactual A: taking the structure of the Portuguese labour employment and the levels of 
Irish labour productivity. 
Counterfactual B: taking the structure of Irish labour employment and the levels of 
Portuguese labour productivity, adjusted by the PPP exchange rate. 
Memo:  
(1) Total labour productivity (Portugal/Ireland): 1979 - 0,520; 1986 - 0,509; 1994 - 0,462; 
2002 - 0,340;  
(2) GDP (Portugal/Ireland): 1979 - 0,913; 1986 - 0,921; 1994 - 0,842; 2002 - 0,580;  
(3) PPP coefficient (2)/(1): 1979 - 1,754; 1986 - 1,810; 1994 - 1,824; 2002 - 1,704. 
Sources: See Table 6. 
 






  Table 10 – Levels of capital per worker in Ireland and Portugal, 1979-2002 
           (USA = 1; and ratios) 
  Physical capital  Human capital 
 1980  2000  1980  2000 
Ireland 
 
0.83 0.94  0.80  0.85 




2.24 1.47  1.36  1.25 
 
   
































































































Agriculture, for. & fish.
Mining and quarrying
Food, drink & tobacco
Textiles, leat., foot. & clothing
Wood, cork & products 
Pul, paper, printing & pub.




Basic & fabric. Metals
Mechanical engineering
Elect. equip. & instruments
Transport equip.
Furniture & misc.
Electricity, gas and water
Construction






Real est. & business serv.
Other services
Non-mark. services
Prt 1979 Prt 2002
Irl 1979 Irl 2002
 
Source: Computed from Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, August 2005  
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24 Chemicals  
26 Non-metallic …
28 Fabricated metal …
30 Office machinery
321 Electronic valves …
33-331 Other instruments
351 Ships and boats
40-41 Electricity …
51 Wholesale trade …
55 Hotels & catering
62 Air transport
65 Financial intermediation …
741-3 Legal …
75 Public administration …




Note: Key to the figure in the Appendix table below. 
Source: Computed from Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, August 2005  
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16,9 16,4 13,9 11,2 14,0
11,8 10,6
8,5
13,5 14,4 16,7 17,9 14,5
17,7 19,0
21,3
1,0 1,1 1,0 1,2
3,6 3,6 2,7 4,4
6,8 6,8 7,2 5,7 6,2 6,3 6,1 4,6
















Source: Computed from Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, August 2005 
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Appendix table – Key to Figure 4: labour productivity per person engaged  
(in chained 1995 Euros, PPP adjusted). Portugal / Ireland 
     
  1979 2002   
01 Agriculture  0,255  0,409 
15-16 Food, drink & tobacco  1,033  0,321 
17 Textiles  1,322  1,025 
18 Clothing  1,088  0,759 
19 Leather and footwear  1,772  1,331 
20 Wood & products of wood and cork  1,316  0,890 
21 Pulp, paper & paper products  1,927  2,972 
22 Printing & publishing  1,269  0,419 
24 Chemicals    1,151  0,161 
25 Rubber & plastics  2,922  1,023 
26 Non-metallic mineral products  1,210  1,132 
27 Basic metals  2,567  1,384 
28 Fabricated metal products  1,035  0,931 
29 Mechanical engineering  1,857  0,717 
30 Office machinery  1,215  0,569 
31-313 Other electrical machinery  2,959  0,388 
321 Electronic valves and tubes  2,199  0,406 
331Scientific instruments  0,432  0,485 
33-331 Other instruments  0,542  0,551 
34 Motor vehicles  2,195  4,529 
351 Building and repairing of ships  1,385  2,125 
352+359 Railroad equipment  0,955  1,343 
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply  3,388  3,258 
45 Construction  0,511  0,601 
51 Wholesale trade   0,682  0,695 
52 Retail trade  1,003  0,979 
55 Hotels & catering  0,800  0,730 
60 Inland transport  0,792  0,498 
62 Air transport  1,962  1,162 
64 Communications  0,547  2,163 
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding  1,401  3,141 
72 Computer and related activities  0,522  0,610 
741-3 Legal, technical and advertising 1,501  0,473 
749 Other business activities, nec  0,523  0,539 
75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  1,216  0,943 
80 Education  1,321  0,822 
85 Health and social work  1,875  1,144 
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES  0,913  0,579 
 
 
Source: See Figure 4.  
 